Abandonment should be mitigated rather than affirmative defences

Crime occurs every day due to a variety of reasons. The failure of social behaviour interaction between members of societies, failure in achieving specific needs, individuals' survivability, opportunities, passion and lack of moral intuition were among the factors accredited to the existence of crime. Often, the accused awaits the fruition of an intended event or crime. At times, the accused was frustrated when the intended crime did not result as expected. However, while the planned crime did not work out, the fact that it was tried is still considered a crime, i.e. the crime of attempt. In any case, issues still need to be addressed when the accused himself abandon an attempt. Could this act still punishable, or the change in the accused moral behaviour, i.e. accused good conscience leaving the crime intended earlier be mitigated? This article addressed the issue of the accused's abandonment of an attempt as an act of voluntary relinquishment with the intention of never again resuming the crime. The study is a purely conceptual one that prolongs the discussion within the ambit of moral and legal philosophy to address the rationality of abandonment as effective mitigation in lights of the accused's moral intuition, prospective reasons, and motive. It endeavours to expand views on motive based on the "Renunciation of Criminal Purpose" principle outlined by the "Model Penal Code". The article is intended to offer new perspectives into both decision and sanction by exploring the question of moral and legal philosophical discretion concerning the abandonment of criminal attempt. It concludes that the essence of abandonment is a legal, philosophical problem that objective parameters cannot simplify.